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intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, the court of
appeals held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 1927
plat and found in favor of the appellants as to the meaning of the
language in the plat.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the wording in the 1927 plat
was clear and unambiguous in stating that all residents of the Long
Beach subdivision had use of the lagoon, which included the residents
of Blocks A, B, and C. The court noted that where terms in an existing
contract are clear and unambiguous, the court could not in effect
create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in the clear
language employed by the parties. Applying this principle, the court
concluded that if the drafters intended to delineate an entirely new
subdivision, they would have done so by eliminating any reference to it
as being a part of the general subdivision. Furthermore, the court
concluded that the language in the plat clearly established Block B as
part of the general subdivision. The court rejected the appellants'
argument that there was any language to indicate an intent to remove
Block B from the general subdivision, which would give exclusive use
of the lagoon to residents of Block B. Therefore, the use of the private
lane and the lagoon were not exclusive to the residents of Block B.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeal's decision
and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
Lori Asher

PENNSYLVANIA
Adams Sanitation Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 715 A.2d 390
(Pa. 1998) (holding that the Department of Environmental Protection
is permitted to order an owner or occupier of land to remedy a
contaminated condition, regardless of fault or knowledge).
Adams Sanitation Company ("ACS") entered into a lease with
Netta S. Deatrick to operate a sanitary landfill on a 108 acre parcel
and, in 1979, obtained a permit from the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") allowing it to dispose of solid waste
on the site. In October of 1983, Keystone Sanitation Company
("Keystone") acquired ASC's assets, name, tradename, lease rights, and
obligations to Deatrick. In November, 1983, Keystone assigned its
rights and obligations under this lease to its new, wholly owned
subsidiary, known as Adams Sanitation Company, Inc. ("Subsidiary").
At that time, ASC had filled seventy-eight acres of the 108 acre parcel
of land. The Subsidiary applied and received a permit from DEP
allowing it to fill the remaining thirty acres. DEP notified the
Subsidiary that it was responsible for the water supply contamination
on a residential tract of land adjacent to the seventy-eight acre site
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previously filled by ASC.
DEP directed the Subsidiary to provide a replacement water supply
to the residence according to Section 1104(a) of the Municipal Waste
Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act, 53 P.S. § 4000.1104(a)
and to develop and implement a program to abate groundwater
contamination emanating from the landfill pursuant to Sections 104
and 602 of the Solid Waste Management Act, Sections 5, 316 and 610
of the Clean Streams Law, and Section 1917-A of the Administrative
Code.
Subsidiary appealed to the Environmental Hearing Board
("EHB"). EHB granted partial summary judgment in favor of DEP.
Subsidiary was directed to restore and replace the water supply, and
comply with DEP's order to submit and implement a groundwater
abatement program. Subsidiary then appealed to the commonwealth
court, which affirmed EHB'sjudgment.
The issue was whether a party who leases a parcel of land for the
operation of a business could be required to abate groundwater
contamination pursuant to Section 316 of the Clean Streams Law
where the record failed to demonstrate that the party either caused or
knew of the contamination. The court held that Section 316 of the
Clean Streams Law allows the DEP to order either the owner or the
occupier of land to correct the condition caused by pollution,
regardless of that party's fault in causing the contamination. The clear
and plain language of Section 316 does not require the DEP to prove
that an owner or occupier of land either knew or should have known
of the existence of the pollution before requiring that party to correct
the condition caused by the contamination.
The court found this construction of Section 316 in accord with
the General Assembly's stated objective in Section 4 of the Clean
Streams Law-that clean, unpolluted streams are absolutely essential
to attract business, to attract tourists, for recreational purposes, and "to
prevent further pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth...
[and] ...to reclaim and restore to a clean, unpolluted condition every
stream in Pennsylvania ......
The court rejected Subsidiary's argument that a party is only liable
for the water pollution it either caused or knew to exist before leasing
or operating on the property. Rather, it found that this interpretation
would undermine the DEP's efforts to achieve the legislature's
mandate set forth under 35 P.S. § 691.4 because it would require the
DEP to conduct an extensive investigation into the cause of the
pollution, before ordering remediation of the polluted site. This
extensive investigation would delay the clean up of the water and cause
the polluted condition to increase while the DEP searched for the
party that caused the pollution.
The court further found a tenant has a proprietary interest in the
land at common law. Here, Subsidiary occupied and had a proprietary
interest in the contaminated site. Therefore, the court permitted the
DEP to order Subsidiary under Section 316 to correct the condition
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without having to prove that Subsidiary caused or knew of the
pollution.
The court also rejected Subsidiary's argument that this was an
abuse of the state's police powers. The court held Subsidiary failed to
explain or demonstrate that the DEP's directive would have a severe
economic impact on its business, or that the directive was a physical
intrusion by the government.
Melody Divine

WASHINGTON
Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 969 P.2d 75 (Wash. 1998)
(holding that submerged tree stumps which caused plaintiffs injuries
while boating were "artificial" within the meaning of the applicable
statute as a matter of law, but whether stumps represented a "latent"
condition was a question for the trier of fact).
To increase the production of electricity from Long Lake Dam, the
Washington Water Power Company ("WWP") raised the level of water
in Long Lake Reservoir over a period of years. Raising the water level
submerged the bases of trees around the perimeter of the lake. WWP
removed the trees but left their stumps, which, when WWP holds the
reservoir at maximum level, lie below the surface of the water. While
boating on Long Lake Reservoir, the plaintiff was injured when his
motor hit one of the submerged tree stumps. The stump flipped the
motor into the boat, striking the plaintiff in the head and shoulders.
The Washington Supreme Court's analysis turned upon the
Washington recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210. Washington's
Revised Code 4.24.210 exempts landowners from liability for injuries
sustained by the public while recreating on the landowner's property
except where the injury stems from a "known dangerous artificial
latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously
posted."
The purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to hold
their property open to the public for recreational purposes without
the fear of liability. A landowner's potential for liability is narrow-it
applies only to specific, limited conditions over which the landowner
presumably has more control.
The issues in this case pertaining to the first defendant, WWP, were
whether the stumps created an "artificial" and "latent" condition as a
matter of law, thereby supporting summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. The court held that the condition was artificial due to the
"man-made change in the natural condition of the water channel ....
"
The court reasoned WWP created the injury-causing condition by
cutting dead trees down, leaving their stumps near the middle of the

